Examining The National Disaster Management Policy Information Technology Essay

Examining The National Disaster Management Policy Information Technology Essay 1. Till recently, the approach to Disaster Management has been reactive and relief centric. A paradigm shift has now taken place at the national level from the relief centric syndrome to holistic and integrated approach with emphasis on prevention, mitigation and preparedness  [1]  . These efforts are aimed to conserve development gains as also minimise losses to lives, livelihood and property. 2. Natural calamities have had a more devastating impact in India because of inadequate policies relating to disaster management and no institutional support systems. However off late, the government has initiated a series of measures towards institutionalized and integrated approach to disaster relief in the country. Background 3. Brief History. The history of disaster management in the Indian context can be traced back to the Great Famine of 1876-1878, which led to the setting up of the Famine Commission in 1880  [2]  . The famine relief code was adopted thereafter, and contained the details of relief to be provided by the government to famine stricken people. India thus had the worlds first disaster relief code. Erstwhile Disaster Management Set Up 4. Disaster management and relief as a function of the Civil Government were entrusted to the Agriculture Ministry  [3]  . The Central Government laid down general policy and exercised overall control and co-ordination. Relief operations were planned and executed by the state and local authorities within their own areas  [4]  . The salient aspects were as follows:- (a) National Policy on Disaster Management. The role of the centre was restricted to policy formulation and allocation of resources for disaster management. The quantum of assistance to be provided depended upon Gravity of the natural calamity, scale of relief operations and requirement of central assistance. (b) Calamities Relief Fund. The Centre had earmarked two funds i.e. Calamities Relief Fund (CRF) and National Fund for Calamities (NFCR). The nodal agency for monitoring natural disasters and recommending the release of these funds was the Crisis Management Group (CMG) in the Ministry of Agriculture headed by the Central Relief Commissioner. (c) Government Response. The Government response to disaster broadly was in two ways viz. Policy and Administrative Response. At policy level, the Prime Minister and Cabinet Committee and the nodal agency i.e. Agriculture Ministry took initiatives to activate administrative machinery to assist and monitor relief operations. The salient aspects of government response were: (i) Preparatory Stage. This involved formulation of National Policy, installation of forecasting and warning system, and advise and assistance to states in policy formulation. (ii) Emergency Stage. Emergency stage involved provision of additional relief assistance, provision of assistance from armed forces and other CPOs, and arrangement and coordination of assistance from foreign countries. (iii) Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. This stage involved assessment of damage and allocation of financial resource for long term relief. 5. National Crisis Management Committee. This committee (NCMC) was constituted in the Cabinet Secretariat with the Cabinet Secretary as its chairman and secretaries of important ministries as its members  [5]  . It gave directions to the crisis management group. The Crisis Management Group was constituted under aegis of Ministry of Agriculture. The Additional Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture was the Relief Commissioner. He was also the Chairman of CMG and looked after matters relating to relief. The resident commissioners of the states affected by the calamity were to be co-opted during the period of crisis. 6. State and District Level Organisation. The state and district level organization was similar to the existing organization with disaster management committees functional at the state and the district level, with the Chief Minister and the District Commissioners responsible for coordination  [6]  . Drawbacks of the Erstwhile Setup 7. The erstwhile setup had a few drawbacks, some of which are as listed below:- (a) The National policy was not comprehensive and measures were adhoc. (b) The implementation was influenced by power groups with vested interests. (c) The central plans lacked coordination, as plans, procedures, organisation and even damage assessment differed widely from state to state. (d) Forecasting and warning though fairly well developed, did not meet requirements completely. (e) There was a lack of national coordination. (f) Inadequate community involvement. (g) An excessive compartmentalisation or sectorisation led to duplication of efforts and consequently development planning drifted away from an integrated nature. Present Disaster Management Set up 8. Background  [7]  . In 1999, the Government of India set up a High Powered Committee (HPC) to develop disaster management plans at the national, state and district levels. While the HPC was engaged in consultations with various stakeholder groups around the country, the super cyclone which hit Orissa in October 1999 and the Bhuj earthquake which hit Gujarat on 26th January 2001 exposed major weaknesses in our disaster preparedness and emergency response capacities. The National Committee on Disaster Management constituted by the Government of India reviewed the High Powered Committee Report and approved some of the recommendations, one of the most significant ones being the shifting of the primary responsibility for disaster management from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Government of India. India became one of the first countries after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004 to declare a national commitment to set up appropriate institutional mechanisms for more effective disaster management at the national, state and district levels. 9. The Disaster Management Bill was unanimously adopted by both houses of Parliament and the Disaster Management Act 2005 demonstrated the national vision of a paradigm shift from post-disaster response to improving the pre-disaster disaster preparedness, initiating disaster mitigation projects and strengthening emergency response capacities in the country. The Disaster Management Act, 2005 stipulated the establishment of requisite institutional mechanisms for drawing up and monitoring the implementation of disaster management plans, ensuring measures by various wings of the government for prevention and mitigating the effects of disasters, and for undertaking a holistic, co-ordinated, and prompt response to any disaster situation. The New Legal and Institutional Framework 10. The Disaster Management Act 2005 envisaged the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), chaired by the Prime Minister of India, as the apex body for disaster management in the country, the State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMAs) chaired by the respective Chief Ministers at the state level and the District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) chaired by the respective District Collectors and co-chaired by the elected representative of the Zilla Parishad in the respective districts. 11. A dedicated agency called the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) has been established with personnel from the para military forces for strengthening the preparedness and emergency response in the country. Ten battalions of the NDRF (see appx ) have been setup and deployed in strategic locations in the country and the NDRF personnel are being trained and equipped with state-of-the-art life saving equipments, search and rescue equipments, inflatable boats, etc. The NDRF personnel are also being trained for preparing and responding to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) emergencies. Since their inception, NDRF personnel have been deployed in many natural disaster situations to assist the local administration. During the Kosi floods in Bihar in 2008, the NDRF personnel evacuated more than 100,000 people from the flood-affected villages through the sustained effort of NDRF search and rescue teams using inflatable boats, bauts and local country boats. 12. The National Institute for Disaster Management (NIDM) has been established as the apex training institute for disaster management in India. NIDM coordinates the capacity building efforts of disaster management faculty in State Training Institutes and is also offering a few distance education programmes in disaster management in collaboration with the World Bank Institute. The NIDM also hosts the SAARC Centre for Disaster Management. The National Vision  [8]   13. The Disaster Management Act 2005 envisages a paradigm shift from the erstwhile relief-centric response to a proactive prevention, mitigation and preparedness-driven approach, so as to conserve the developmental gains and also minimize losses to lives, livelihoods and property. The National Vision for disaster management is to build a safer and disaster-resilient India by developing a holistic, proactive, multi-hazard and technology-driven strategy. This will be achieved through a culture of prevention, mitigation and preparedness to generate a prompt and efficient response at the time of disasters. The entire process will centre-stage the community and will be provided momentum and sustenance through the collective efforts of all Government agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 14. The National Disaster Management Act. The National Disaster Management Bill was introduced by the Government on 08 May 2005 and promulgated into an act on 25 Dec 2005  [9]  . The law on disaster management provides for requisite institutional mechanisms for drawing up and monitoring the implementation of the disaster management plans, ensuring measures by various wings of Government for prevention and mitigating effects of disasters and for undertaking a holistic, coordinated and prompt response to any disaster situation. 15. The Disaster Management Bill, 2005 provides for setting up the following:- National Disaster Management Authority under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister. State Disaster Management Authorities under the Chairmanship of the Chief Ministers. District Disaster Management Authorities under the Chairmanship of District Magistrates. Ministries / Departments to draw up department-wise plans in accordance with the national disaster management plan. National Disaster Response Force. National Institute of Disaster Management. National Fund for Disaster Response and the National Fund for Disaster Mitigation and similar Funds at the State and District levels. (h) Specific role for Local Bodies in disaster management including Panchayati Raj Institutions as well as Urban Local Bodies like Municipalities. 16. National Disaster Management Policy. The National Disaster Management Policy is a comprehensive document that articulates the vision of the Government of India towards achieving the goal of a disaster resilient India  [10]  . The objectives of the policy:-. Promoting a culture of prevention, preparedness and resilience at all levels through knowledge, innovation and education. Encouraging mitigation measures based on technology, traditional wisdom and environmental sustainability. Mainstreaming disaster management into the developmental planning process. Establishing institutional and techno-legal frameworks to create an enabling regulatory environment and a compliance regime. Ensuring efficient mechanism for identification, assessment and monitoring of disaster risks. Developing contemporary forecasting and early warning systems backed by responsive and failsafe communication with information technology support. Promoting a productive partnership with the media to create awareness and contributing towards capacity development. Ensuring efficient response and relief with a caring approach towards the needs of the vulnerable sections of the society. (j) Undertaking reconstruction as an opportunity to build disaster resilient structures and habitat for ensuring safer living. (k) Promoting productive and proactive partnership with media in disaster management. 17. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). This has been established under the Chairperson of Prime Minister and nine members, including a Vice Chairperson nominated  [11]  . The duties of NDMA are as given below:- Lay down policies on disaster management. Approve the National Plan and plans prepared by the ministries or departments of the Government of India. Lay down guidelines to be followed by the State Authorities in drawing up the State Plan and different ministries or departments for integrating the measures for prevention of disaster or the mitigation of its effects in their development plans and projects. Coordinate the enforcement and implementation of the policies and plans for disaster management. Recommend provisioning of funds for the purpose of mitigation. Provide such support to other countries affected by major disasters as determined by the Government. Lay down broad policies and guidelines for the functioning of the National Institute of Disaster Management. 18. The NDMA may constitute an advisory committee consisting of experts in the field of disaster management and having practical experience of disaster management at the National, State or District level to make recommendations on different aspects of disaster management. (a) Organisation of NDMA. National Disaster Management Authority has been constituted with the Prime Minister of India as its Chairman, a Vice Chairman with the status of Cabinet Minister, and eight members with the status of Ministers of State.   Each of the members has a well defined functional domain covering various states as also disaster specific areas of focus and concern. A functional infrastructure has been built which is appropriate for disaster management involving uncertainties coupled with desired plans of action. Each member of the Authority heads disaster-specific divisions for specific disaster and functional domains. Each member has also been given the responsibility of  specified states and UTs for close interaction and coordination. The NDMA organization is enclosed along with. The NDMA Secretariat, headed by a Secretary is responsible to provide secretarial support and continuity. It is proposed to have two Disaster Management Wings under the Secretariat. They are :- (i) DM I Wing. This wing will deal with mitigation, preparedness, plans, reconstruction, community awareness and dealing with financial/administrative aspects. (ii) DM II Wing. This wing is proposed to be composed of the National Disaster Management Operations Centre with the state-of-the-art multi-redundant communication systems, to carry out the tasks of capacity development, training and knowledge management. 19. The National Executive Committee. It consists of Secretary from Ministry of Home Affairs as the Chairperson and members as the Secretaries from the Ministries of Agriculture, Atomic Energy, Defence, Drinking Water Supply, Environment and Forests, Finance (expenditure), Health, Power, Rural Development, Science and Technology, Space, Telecommunication, Urban Development, Water Resources and the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)  [12]  . Duties. The duties of this committee include :- Prepare the National Plan to be approved by the National Authority. (ii) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of the National Policy. (iii) Lay down guidelines and provide technical assistance for preparing disaster management plans by different ministries and the State Authorities. (iv) Evaluate the preparedness at all governmental levels for the purpose of responding to any threatening disaster situation and give directions thereon. (v) Plan and coordinate specialised training programmes for disaster management for different levels of officers, employees and voluntary workers. (vi) Coordinate response in the event of a disaster situation and give directions to concerned ministries and State Governments. (vii) Require any department or agency of the Government to make available to the National / State Authority such men or material resources as are available with it for the purposes of emergency response, rescue and relief. The Mandate. The NEC is the executive committee of the NDMA, and is mandated to assist the NDMA in the discharge of its functions and also ensure compliance of the directions issued by the Central Government. NEC is to coordinate the response in the event of any threatening disaster situation or disaster. NEC will prepare the National Plan for Disaster Management based on the National Policy on Disaster Management. NEC will monitor the implementation of guidelines issued by NDMA. It will also perform such other functions as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the NDMA. 20. The National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC). For effective implementation of relief measures in the wake of a disaster, the cabinet has set up a National Crisis Management Committee. The concerned Secretary shall provide all necessary information and seek directions of the Cabinet Committee in all matters concerning relief and step for effective implementation of its directions. In the absence of such a Cabinet Committee all matters relating to relief shall be reported to the Cabinet Secretary. The composition of the committee will be as under :- (a) Composition. The composition of the NCMC is as under: (i) Cabinet Secretary Chairman. (ii) Secretary to Prime Minister Member. (iii) Secretary (MHA) Member. (iv) Secretary (MOD) Member. (v) Director (IB) Member. (vi) Secretary (RAW) Member. (vii) Secretary (Agriculture Cooperation) Co-opted Member. (viii) An officer of Cabinet Convener. 21. Cabinet Committee on Management of Natural Calamities(CCMNC). CCMNC has been constituted to oversee all aspects relating to the management of natural calamities including assessment of the situation and identification of measures and programmes considered necessary to reduce its impact, monitor and suggest long term measures for prevention of such calamities, formulate and recommend programmes for public awareness for building up societys resilience to them  [13]  . 22. High Level Committees. In the case of calamities of severe nature, Inter-Ministerial Central Teams are to be deputed to the affected states for assessment of damage caused by the calamity and the amount of relief assistance required. The IMG, headed by the Union Home Secretary, will scrutinize the assessment made by the Central Teams and recommend the quantum of assistance to be provided to the States from the National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF). The HLC comprising the Finance Minister as Chairman, and the Home Minister, Agriculture Minister Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission as members approves the central assistance to be provided to the affected States based on the recommendations of the IMG. The constitution and composition of HLC may vary from time to time. The Vice Chairman, NDMA will be a special invitee to the HLC. 23. Role of Central Ministries. Nodal Ministries for various disasters have been designated. These are: (a) Natural Disasters Agricultural and Cooperation. (b) Chemical Disasters Environment and Forest. (c) Nuclear Disaster Department of Atomic Energy. (d) Biological Disaster Health. (e) Civil Strife Home. 24. Control Room (Emergency Operation Room). An Emergency Operations Center (Control Room) exists in the nodal Ministry of Home Affairs, which functions round the clock, to assist the Central Relief Commissioner in the discharge of his duties  [14]  . The activities of the Control Room include collection and transmission of information concerning natural calamity and relief, keeping close contact with governments of the affected States, interaction with other Central Ministries / Departments / Organizations in connection with relief, maintaining records containing all relevant information relating to action points and contact points in Central Ministries etc., keeping up-to-date details of all concerned officers at the Central and State levels. 25. Contingency Action Plan. A National Contingency Action Plan (CAP) for dealing with contingencies arising in the wake of natural disasters has been formulated by the Government of India and it is being periodically updated. It facilitates the launching of relief operations without delay. The CAP identifies the initiatives required to be taken by various Central Ministries/Departments in the wake of natural calamities, sets down the procedure and determines the focal points in the administrative machinery. 26. State Level Organisation. The primary responsibility for disaster management rests with the States. In view of their autonomous jurisdiction, the States have evolved their own relief machinery. At State level the Relief Commissioner or Revenue Secretary, is the nodal agency for direction of relief effort. In most states, a state level committee, chaired by the Chief Minister, acts as a policy formulating forum and monitoring body. Some states have evolved efficient disaster management plans with the requisite infrastructure and organizational support. These as in the case of Maharashtra, include an Emergency Operations Centre in the State Secretariat, which is linked to the district by an efficient wireless and satellite based communication network. This is backed by a computerised District Management Information System Community Disaster Preparedness Programmes. (a) State Disaster Management Committee. At the State level, the SDMA, headed by the Chief Minister, lays down policies and plans for disaster management in the State. It will, approves the State Plan in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the NDMA, coordinates the implementation of the State Plan, recommends provision of funds for mitigation and preparedness measures and review the developmental plans of the different departments of the State to ensure integration of prevention, preparedness and mitigation measures. (b) State Executive Committee (SEC). This has state Chief Secretary as the Chairperson with four Secretaries of appropriate departments. It performs the same functions as the National Executive Committee as regards coordination, monitoring and implementation of State Plan in accordance to the National Plan, including all measures for prevention, mitigation and capacity building 27. District Level Organisation. At the district level, District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs), will act as the district planning, coordinating and implementing body for disaster management and will take all measures for the purposes of disaster management in the district in accordance with the guidelines laid by NDMA and SDMA. The District Control Rooms would be the nodal facility for directing all operations on disaster emergency situation, and hence are required to be supported by disaster management information and communications to function efficiently. The DDMAs would be established for every district in the State and shall consist of the Chairperson and seven members. It shall consist of the following:- (a) The Collector / District Magistrate / Deputy Commissioner of the district as the Chairperson. (b) The elected representative of the local authority who shall be the Co-Chairperson. (c) The Chief Executive Officer of the District Authority. The Superintendent of Police. The Chief Medical Officer of the district. (f) Two other district level officers, to be appointed by the State Government. Enunciation of Policy 28. Disaster Management : Tenets in Indian Context  [15]  . A disaster refers to a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence from natural or man-made causes, which is beyond the coping capacity of the affected community. Disaster Management involves a continuous and integrated process of planning, organising, coordinating and implementing measures which are necessary or expedient for the following :- (a) Prevention of danger or threat of any disaster. (b) Mitigation or reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or consequences. (c) Capacity building including research and knowledge management. (d) Preparedness to deal with any disaster. (e) Prompt response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster. (f) Assessing the severity or magnitude of effects of any disaster. (g) Evacuation, rescue and relief. (h) Rehabilitation and reconstruction. (j) Community involvement and awareness general. (k) Close interaction with corporate sector Non Governmental Organisations and media. Strengths and Weaknesses of National Disaster Management System 29. Weaknesses of Indias Disaster Management System. (a) Political Interference and Myopic View. Our political system is dominant in all our policies and programmes. The policy makers look for short term gains to keep their vote banks intact, resulting in myopic view of entire disaster management system. Policies and programmes requiring long term planning and implementation take back seat. (b) Relief centric approach. Our system is primarily focused on relief rather than prevention of disasters. Majority of the effort and organizations are preparing towards the actions after the occurrence of a calamity. (c) Community Awareness and Development. During most of the disasters like earthquakes, cyclones, tsunamis, etc the main reason for the high loss to life is due to ignorance of the affected populace about the actions which they are required to do. There are number of incidents, specially during earthquakes, wherein people due to panic moved inside the buildings and got buried in the debris. The Therefore concerted effort in this direction is a mandatory requirement. The community needs to be well informed about the physical features of their location / settlement and the hazard events they are likely to experience. Such a social consciousness about disasters leads to building an organization / network within the community for risk reduction. But, due to lack of concerted efforts, the masses are still quite ignorant of the linkages between development and disasters, nature conservation and role of community in prevention, reduction and relief in case of disasters. A case in point is t he tragedy wherein over 400 school children who were parading out in the open in Village Anjar (Gujarat) were taken inside the school building on occurrence of the earthquake. Nearly all the children died when the school building collapsed. (d) Lack of Role Clarity and Integration of Role Players. Disaster Management is an exercise which involves a large No of players eg Central and State Govts, Armed Forces, Paramilitary Forces, Police Forces, NGOs, PSUs, Private Sector, Community and so on. The integration of disaster risk management functions within local institutions is key to achieving urban risk reduction. Their role has to be clearly defined during various stages of disaster management to avoid ambiguous situations. During the relief and rehabilitation stage post Gujarat Earthquake, a No of tasks were getting duplicated by various NGOs, State Govt and the army columns, resulting in wastages of efforts and confusion. (e) Sub-Optimal Outcomes. Due to lack of integration of efforts, our disaster management system suffers from lack of synergy at various levels. (f) Early Warning System, Forecasting and Communication Infrastructure. Not all disasters can be forecasted but areas vulnerable to disasters can be identified and measures taken in advance to reduce own losses to minimum eg in spite of knowing that Gujarat was in seismic Zone V, a large No of high-rise buildings were allowed to be built in Ahmedabad in the areas where water bodies existed a couple of years ago. Most of the buildings which collapsed were hose which had not complied to the Code of construction I earthquake prone areas. (g) Disaster Management Training. The training culture in India leaves much to be desired. In the case of Gujarat earthquake, while the rescue equipment / heavy equipment eg iron concrete cutters, excavators were provisioned, not many locals knew how to operate these. There is dearth of personnel who are trained in rescue and relief operations. Most are trained in elementary techniques. (h) Absence of Strategic Thinking and Infirmities in Decision Making Process. There is an overall lack of strategic thinking and swift decision making in our system owing to bureaucracy and politicization of all issues. The two if taken care of will enhance our preparedness to a large extent. (j) Financial Support and Corruption. One there is a deficiency of funds to plan and implement disaster Prevention and Reduction Programmes eg linking up of all the rivers, construction of dams etc. Two, of whatever funds get allotted only a small percentage gets to reach the grass roots level owing to rampant corruption in the system. (k) Inadequacy of Specialized Equipment. A major weakness is the inadequacy of state-of-the-art equipment required for rescue and relief operations. A lot of equipment is requisitioned from foreign countries on being hit by a calamity. (

The Club Culture Essay -- Hip Hop Dancing Cultural Essays

The Club Culture The club culture-hundreds of thousands of young people across the country, covered in sweat and rhythmically throbbing to a beat- has long been filled with stigmas and stereotypes; the idea that hip-hop music is only for people of African descent, or solely for the "impoverished youth" as Dale Kleinschmidt, an ex-DJ and amateur break dancer from Dallas, puts it, has been a common view associated with the hip-hop scene by the masses. Dale got interested in break dancing because, as he says, "he wanted to look cool." In the beginning, the idea of being able to break dance was funny to him- he had already been involved in the dance scene, but he had never been a b-boy, he just DJed. A lot of Dale's interest in the dance aspect of the clubs came from his DJing experiences. Dale really started dancing when he met up with a group of Hispanic kids- that he had known from the scene already- and discovered that they had formed a break dancing crew. They decided to take Dale "under their wings." The fact that the Hispanic kids were the ones dancing, and that they were so accepting of Dale- a middle-upper class white kid- says a lot about the falseness of the racial stereotypes involved in the scene. "& it's a very embracing culture," says Dale, "which a lot of people find surprising, but if you go out there no one's gonna give you crap for trying& " According to Dale, the only people that the club kids typically dislike are the ones that detach themselves from the scene. "& say you go to a club and just sit in the back corner, or you just try to hit on girls, that's fine, but the break dancers are probably just gonna look down on you& " The thought that a person should interact in any of what Dale calls "the fou... ...petitive nature of the scene-but the fact remains that the break dance circles seem to be filled with masculine face. Despite the stereotypes I have heard about the hip-hop culture, and the apparently male-dominated scene, after my interview with Dale I would have to dispel those accusations. Of course there will be "purists" as Dale said, and people who believe that they deserve more respect because they have been involved in the scene longer, but in the bigger view, the dance culture seems to be one of the most accepting scenes that exists. If you have a genuine interest in the culture, as in anything, there is no reason that you shouldn't attempt to take part in it. The scene from the beginning was a do-it-yourself scene, and in break dancing there are no rules. Get out there and do what you want- if you honestly respect the scene you should have no problems.

Phenomenon :: essays research papers

John Travolta. Those two words used to send millions of women (and men) all around the world into a dancing frenzy back in the seventies. He could claim credit for the modern equivalent of the estrogen brigades (for the net crazy "X-philes") of Fox Mudler and Assistant Director Skinner. But nowadays, equipped with a paunch and that same disarming smile, he is proving himself to be more than a passing fever. Together with the great cast of this latest offering from the Disney studios, Travolta lifts "Phenomenon" (tele-kinetically, no less) above the mass of mediocre summer releases. For doubting thomases who thought his brilliant gun-slinging portrayal in "Pulp Fiction" was just "luck of the draw", his portrayal of a simpleton with nothing but heart should re-categorise Travolta from "comeback kid" to "talented actor"; he did not allow "Phenomenon" to degenerate into "Forrest Gump Part 2". The similarities are obvious: a nice, simple fellow earns the favour of Lady Luck and does extraordinary things. Yet, that's all there is. "Phenomenon" packs a higher reality-density than "Gump". Countless scenes in "Gump" had me trying to pull wool over my eyes just to stop myself from laughing at the sheer ludicrousness. Despite the fact that going to the movies is about the suspension of disbelief, it should never be equated with treating the audiences as hoards after hoards of idiots. George Malley (Travolta), on the other hand, comes across very naturally (and believably) as a small town simpleton who doesn't know what to make of his very strange birthday "present". One flash of light and he flips through calculus books in a flash. It's not heavenly intervention, but unleashing the possibility of what the mind is truly capable of. Yet, George quickly learns that he isn't capable of something: affecting what other people think. Small-town insecurities and parochialism soon turn once friends into dumber-than-simpleton fools; with the exception of three very well casted characters. Kyra Sedgwick plays Lace, George's love interest. The agony of having gone through the loss of her perfect family show through her smiles. Despite being intent on keeping George at arms' length, head-strong Lace falls in love with George, with no small help from her two precocious kids. Gerard Dipego's choice of the two kids as parallels and inversions of the adults' relationship is simply brilliant. It is the little girl who extends herself to George when Lace plays the silent, "I want to keep my life simple" girl.

Catcher in the Rye Essay: The Need for Control -- Catcher Rye Essays

Need for Control in Catcher in the Rye  Ã‚  Ã‚   With his work, The Catcher in the Rye   J. D. Salinger created a literary piece that was completely unique. The entire novel was written from the first person viewpoint of the 17-year-old boy Holden Caulfield. The majority of the story is compiled of Holden's rudimentary monologue of â€Å"complexly simple† thoughts, the rest utilizing his relay of previous dialogue. That, along with the use of unique punctuation, digressing explanations, and complex characterization, transforms the simple plot into a complex literary classic. The novel's dialogue and monologue alike manage to relay the feel of natural speaking such as "I mean you'd be different in some way - I can't explain what I mean." The contractions â€Å"you'd† and â€Å"can't†, since they are common in everyday language, establish a very common and simple tone. Stress on the first syllable of "different" reinforces the tone by demonstrating how typically they speak. He uses dashes for pauses and the sig naling of associative digressions. Instead of for signaling pauses, commas are used only where mechanically required. "So all of a sudden, I ran like a madman across the street - I d*** near got myself killed doing it, if you want to know the truth - and went in this stationary store and bought a pad and pencil." ***CITE THIS???***   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Holden Caulfield creates a thought-provoking point of view. On the surface, many of his thought patterns seem unrelated and stray from the topic. His association of topic with digression is used almost constantly throughout the novel. However, realizing that these digressions are very relevant and even crucial to the topic, he allows the reader to gain true insight into the character. His statements ... ... His being the lone "big" person expresses his desire of being in control. The playing in the rye field next to a crazy cliff would depict the nearness to his fall while being oblivious to the danger. His one wish is to be able to prevent this, to be in control. Then, after establishing his wishes, he considers it impossible by expressing thoughts of it's craziness. He has resolved that he cannot be in control, but it is all he wants. In a world before alternatives to his painful lifestyle, what can Holden do but blindly play the game in the rye field, right beside his cliff of sanity. "But life is a game, boy. Life is a game that one must play by the rules."    Bibliography 3rd edition Psychology (Bernstein-Stewart, Roy, Srull, & Wickens) Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, Massachusetts 1994    NOTES ***YOU MUST CITE ALL THE QUOTES FROM THE NOVEL***

Finance Manager

Fiscal Policy in Kenya: Looking Toward the Medium-to Long-Term By Kamau Thugge, Peter S Heller, and Jane Kiringai[1] Executive Summary Kenya’s authorities, in articulating their vision for the next two decades of Kenya’s development, understood clearly that fiscal policy would need to play a critical role in influencing the pace at which the economy will grow and its capacity to deal with the key challenges that will arise over the next several decades.Domestic policy challenges include a high population growth, rapid urbanization, significant weaknesses in infrastructural capacity, inadequate levels of investments, and pressures for decentralization. External challenges include security risks as well as an uncertain global economic growth environment. Fiscal policy will not only affect macroeconomic stability, but also whether Kenya can transition to a higher economic growth path, reduce its high poverty rate, and address its substantial income, asset, and regional ine qualities.The paper by Thugge, Heller and Kiringai examines whether Kenya’s medium-term fiscal policy strategy is responsive to addressing the potential scale of the challenges confronting Kenya, particularly given the inevitable uncertainties assicuated with the global economic environment. It also takes stock of the impact of recent developments on the viability of the original strategy. Kenya is likely to face in the next two decades and the scope of its policy goals for this period.Section II will briefly identify both the domestic policy challenges that Kenya’s fiscal policy-makers must address in coming years as well as the different potential external policy environments within which these policies must be formulated. Section III reviews the Government of Kenya’s (GOK) fiscal policy strategy, as broadly embodied in its recently issued long-run perspective–Vision 2030, but more concretely in the Medium Term Plan for 2008/09-2012/13 and the Medium-Te rm Budget Strategy Paper (MTBSP) for 2009/10-11/12.In particular, it will examine the economic and institutional assumptions underlying this strategy; the policy choices made in terms of the balance between the roles of the public and private sectors; the choice among alternative public spending priorities; the way in which possible downside risks are addressed; the approach to financing fiscal initiatives; and the sustainability of the fiscal and debt strategy. Section IV will then assess whether the GOK’s chosen policy strategies appear both responsive to the long-term policy challenges identified in Section II and robust to the downside risks in the external economic environment.II. Medium to long-run challenges In Vision 2030, Kenya aspires to achieve middle-income status by 2030 through the realization of a 10 percent per annum real growth rate for the period 2012-2030. This is a highly ambitious objective although not an unreasonable aspiration, given the importance of Kenya to the regional economy of East Africa and the many assets that Kenya possesses in terms of its human capital and its industrial, service, and tourism potential.But achieving this goal will require that Kenya successfully pursue disciplined and ambitious policies that will confront the many domestic and external policy challenges it now faces. It will also require a bit of luck and a bit of skill by Kenyan policy-makers in adapting to the uncertain global economic policy environment that will undoubtedly emerge in the next two decades. Fiscal policy will need to be finely balanced if Kenya is to achieve the Vision 2030 objectives.It must facilitate rapid growth—both through the provision of needed infrastructure and human capital—while still being responsive both to the demands of the population for basic public services and the potential downside risks that may emerge. Yet fiscal policy must also be sustainable. Fiscal space will be precious if the various expen diture objectives are to be met without compromising macroeconomic stability or raising doubts about Kenya’s solvency. If growth proves less than anticipated—as occurred in 2008 and as expected in 2009—the needed fiscal space may prove inadequate to finance the required government outlays.Under these circumstances, unrestrained recourse to additional borrowing could jeopardize Kenya’s solvency and crowd-out its private sector. a. Domestic policy challenges to which fiscal policy should respond There are several important obstacles that could impede Kenya’s progress toward achieving the high growth rate targeted through 2030. First, after years of neglect, Kenya has only recently begun to address the inadequacy of its infrastructure for the realization of a modern, 21st century economy.Deficiencies exist in terms of Kenya’s port facilities, its trunk and secondary roads, its railroad system, its energy plant, and in the availability of clean water and sanitation facilities. While telecommunications has been the bright light of the last several years, there is still much to be done to make the system fully accessible and the proposed undersea fiber-optic cable, The East Africa Marine System, should help in this regard. Vision 2030’s emphasis on rebuilding and creating a productive infrastructure is rightly supported by international observers (e. . , in the IMF’s 2009 staff report) and appears responsive to this challenge. [2] But creating this infrastructure will be costly and could easily outstrip the domestic financial capacity of the government if it were to go it alone, justifying the government’s interest in seeking public-private partnerships as well as external financial support. Second, while Kenya is blessed with relatively a high quality and deep base of human capital, it has yet to find ways to deploy it more efficiently.Among African countries, Kenya has always been known for the high as pirations of its population for education and the drive of its citizens for self-betterment. But the productivity of Kenya’s educational system has long been a source of concern, and the continuing weaknesses in the health system have meant that infant and mortality rates are still too high, that malaria still poses a heavy health burden, and that the AIDS epidemic has cost Kenya significant losses among its most productive citizens. 3] The success of many Asian countries in realizing high growth rates when they were at Kenya’s stage in the demographic transition derived from their ability to productively employ the rising share of the working-age population. Strengthening the quality and exploiting the productive use of Kenya’s human capital, particularly looking forward, must thus be a high policy priority. Third, governance concerns remain an obstacle to Kenya fully exploiting its growth potential through foreign investment inflows.While the World Bankâ€℠¢s â€Å"Doing Business Indicators† suggest some improvements in creating the conditions for a receptive foreign investment climate (with Kenya ranking among the world’s top ten reformers in 2006/07), Kenya still ranks only 82nd on this index out of 181 countries, and ranks 147 out of 180 countries in terms of Transparency International’s index of perceptions of corruption for 2008. [4] Prioritizing and effectively carrying out the necessary institutional reforms, while not requiring substantial fiscal resources, may still prove costly and difficult in political economy terms.More important, it may play a critical role in determining whether Kenya can meet its ambitious investment goals in infrastructure, given that they are to be primarily financed from private sources through public-private partnerships. Fourth, to achieve its target growth, Kenya will not only need to raise significantly its pace of investment (from an average of 19% of GDP in 2005/06 to 2007 /08 to over 30% by 2012/13), but also to maintain the relatively low incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) of about 3 that it has experienced over the last few years.The latter may prove difficult. Among low and low-middle income countries, an ICOR of about 4 seems the norm (see World Bank, 2009). For the few non-oil-based countries in the world that have experienced growth rates as high as 10% for a sustained period, investment rates have been in the range of 40% of GDP plus (e. g. , China), reflecting a loss of efficiency in capital investment (and thus a higher ICOR). For Kenya to realize more efficiency from its investments, it must demonstrate a concomitant capacity to mobilize human capital resources effectively (e. . , rectifying both the under- and overstaffing of different public service activities), efficiency in the utilization of capital inputs, adequate attention to routine and periodic maintenance of existing infrastructure and a focus on investments that are of part icularly high return (the latter influencing the appropriate structure of Kenya’s public and private investment programme). Linked to these issues is the low absorptive and implementation capacity in the key infrastructure line ministries, particularly for foreign-financed projects.A key challenge that will determine whether the desired change in the composition of expenditure materializes will be the actual implementation rate of the development budget. In the past, actual expenditures have fallen well short of budget estimates, and in particular, absorption of donor development assistance has been very low—usually below 50 percent of budgeted amounts. Increasing the implementation capacity of the infrastructure ministries, and especially that of the Ministry of Roads and Public Works, will, therefore be critical.Fifth, generating the required financing for a higher level of investment will be a further challenge. A sound fiscal policy will constrain how much can dire ctly be provided from the budget, leading to the acknowledged need to rely on the private sector, domestic and external, for the remaining financing. The modalities by which Kenya provides incentives and deals with the risks associated with public-private partnerships, and improves governance, will determine the extent of foreign capital participation in Kenya’s investment programme.Six, despite the progress made in reducing poverty incidence from 57% in 2002 to 46% in 2006 (MTBSP, paragraph. 14), Kenya still faces high income and asset inequality as well as significant regional inequality in incomes and assets. While rapid growth over the next two decades would do much to reduce absolute poverty levels, the number of absolute poor will still remain substantial. Together with continued high inequality, this would constitute a significant drag, in political economy terms, on Kenya’s ability to obtain popular support for an ambitious resource mobilization and savings eff ort.Certainly, unless addressed, income inequality will constrain growth in the country, dampen the scope for poverty reduction and create an environment for social and political unrest. Seventh, and linked to the latter point, current fiscal decentralization efforts to address regional inequality through the use of a devolved funds mechanism are subject to potential vulnerabilities. In principle, through community-based projects, such an approach can have a positive impact on grass roots[5] support.However, slippages in governance and accountability, efficiency, or effectiveness in the use of devolved funds could undermine their potential impact, with political pressures engendering spending programs that would not normally meet benefit-cost criteria or address the existing regional maldistribution of resources. In the medium term, three potential threats to the effectiveness of a devolved funds approach require attention.First, is the poverty-weighted allocation criteria, which ef fectively incentivises constituencies to be ranked poor in order to qualify for a higher share of the devolved resources. Second, the provision of such ‘free’ budgetary resources may dampen revenue generation efforts at the local level. Third, the disconnect between community-based projects and the provision for operations and maintenance within the central budget can limit efficiency and effectiveness in the use of these funds[6].All of the above factors might be considered as relevant in formulating current budgetary policies. But Kenya also confronts other future developments that can easily undermine the long-term capacity of the economy to sustain rapid growth. These include: †¢ The rapid rate of urbanization: By 2025, Nairobi and Mombasa will have to invest in urban infrastructure (e. g. , housing, water, sewage, transport, schools and health facilities) to accommodate a virtual doubling of their populations. 7] The size of other urban centers will more than double by 2025 (from 3. 8 million to 9. 3 million). [8] Overall, the urban population is projected to triple to 21-22 million. Such urban infrastructure investments are likely to be of a lower overall productivity (thus implying a higher ICOR), further constraining the prospects for achieving the high efficiency level required to realize a 10% annual growth rate. †¢ The continued high overall population growth rate: Kenya’s fertility rate of 5 is high.The population aged 5-14—the prospective primary and secondary school-age groups—is anticipated to rise during 2005-2030 by at least 60 percent (more than 5. 2 million children). This highlights both the prospective increase that will be needed in spending on Kenya’s primary and secondary school system and the substantial expansion that is likely to be needed for tertiary education facilities. The latter will be particularly costly, and will put enormous pressure on the education budget (with one tertia ry student costing the equivalent of 40 primary students).Without policies that will encourage a reduced fertility rate, Kenya’s capacity to create fiscal space by shifting the composition of government expenditure towards growth-enhancing investments will be severely limited. †¢ The pressures for job creation arising from population growth: In the next 6 years, Kenya’s education system will produce at least 14 million new school leavers seeking jobs. While the public sector cannot be responsible for their employment, government expenditure policies will need to be sensitive to the job creation possibilities associated with the realization of the government’s expenditure program.This burgeoning employment challenge also highlights the importance associated with a successful transition to a high growth policy framework, since this will be the key to meeting the continuing pressure for job creation over the medium- to long-term. †¢ Cost pressures in the public sector: as with most middle-income and industrial economies, rapid productive growth in the economy typically will outpace productivity growth in the government sector.As wages in the public sector respond to market wage developments in the private sector, this will create cost-push pressures on public service delivery (particularly in the social sectors) (the so-called â€Å"Baumol effect†), pushing up the recurrent cost budget and generating further need for a higher revenue share. †¢ The looming costs of climate change: Recent World Bank reports suggest that Kenya is among the countries most at risk from an increased frequency and intensity of drought conditions.Addressing the potential deleterious effects on agricultural productivity will require a combination of intensified investment in water-control systems that promote enhanced efficiency in the use of water resources; a further shift in the role of nonagricultural outputs (and thus a capacity to become co mpetitive in earning the foreign exchange required for a higher level of food imports); and new R&D efforts at promoting agricultural techniques robust to drought and uncertain precipitation conditions.Given the importance of Mombasa as Kenya’s principal port, the probability of a sea level rise raises the question of when it will become necessary for Kenya to undertake the investments required to cope with the potential longer-term damages to Mombasa and what alternative approaches might be needed to ensure a continued viable port capacity. Less of a challenge and more of an opportunity is the possibility that Kenya might be able to exploit its comparative advantage with respect to solar and geo-thermal energy generation, and earn additional export and fiscal revenues from selling carbon credits to other high-emission countries. The budgetary risks associated with recognized contingent liabilities: the most obvious include those associated with the pay-as-you-go budgetary fu nding of civil service pensions; the potential for the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) to be relatively unfunded; and the possibility of losses associated with the parastatal sector. The anticipated effort by the Government to seek public-private partnerships in a number of infrastructure projects carries with it the potential for additional contingent liabilities. b. External policy challengesKenya’s ability to achieve its Vision 2030 objectives is not wholly subject to its own making. The global financial crisis which commenced in 2008 has adversely impacted Kenya, and highlighted the importance of external factors in influencing the growth of an economy. Kenya is vitally integrated within the global economy, being dependent on external commodity markets for its exports and critical energy imports, sensitive to the state of global tourism markets, significantly reliant on remittances, a recipient of aid flows, and ambitious in its pursuit of both direct foreign investm ent flows and possible external credits.In geopolitical terms, it has already experienced terrorist incidents and is a vital transport hub for many important countries in Central Africa. But of course the future is uncertain, particularly if one is considering policy options looking out more than 20 years. There is, thus, an important argument for seeking a policy program that is robust to potential downside risks and the possibility of very different external environments. One approach to exploring the robustness of the Vision 2030 fiscal strategy is to examine its viability in the context of alternative scenarios of the future.In 2005, the World Bank undertook just such an exercise to consider alternative scenarios for how the global economy might evolve through 2020. Each of the three scenarios elaborated were meant to constitute â€Å"relevant, compelling, plausible, and logically consistent†, but, importantly, divergent stories of what the global economy might look like in 2020. As emphasized by the Bank, â€Å"no single scenario will ever come true in its entirety, but if it is to be a valuable stone against which to sharpen one’s strategy, one must believe it just might! Box 3 provides a brief summary of these three different worlds, and section IV will examine more concretely the robustness of Vision 2030 in the context of these scenarios. At this point, what is important to emphasize are the key external policy factors to which the success of Vision 2030 might prove sensitive, and the way in which these scenarios highlight potential issues to which Kenyan policy makers might need to be responsive. Among the key factors that could affect Kenya’s prospects, the following appear most relevant: Robustness of global growth: Kenya’s capacity for mobilizing the fiscal resources required to implement its public investment program (and equally the prospect for the private sector to also achieve the targeted growth in its investment share) will be strongly influenced by the pace and structure of global growth. Given its dependence on external commodity and tourism services, a slower global growth scenario (such as in the GU scenario) would probably be reflected in slower Kenyan growth, lower fiscal revenues, and the need for a smaller budgetary envelope.How would the budget be prioritized in such circumstances? Would the same infrastructure and human capital investment priorities be relevant under a lower global growth scenario? Certainly, with the pace of population and urban growth (not to mention climate change) not affected by external factors, the pressure would be to cutback on precisely those investments most likely to generate additional growth and employment!Moreover, if global growth were to be dominated by a higher share derived from emerging markets, would this adversely affect Kenya (perhaps through reduced tourism from industrial countries)? Would reduced dynamism in the US and European economies imply a lower level of concessional financing, or would Kenya be able to obtain such assistance from alternative sources (e. g. , China and India)? With changes in the pace or sources of global growth, would Kenya still be able to realize the currently anticipated level of direct foreign investment flows?Would these derive from different sources and if so, would they be directed to the same sectors? |Box 1: Alternative Scenarios for the World of 2020 | | | |The following provides a brief summary of how these different worlds will appear, with our focus principally on the character of | |the alternative potential external economic environments facing Kenya. | | |Affluence, Ltd. (AL) | |Years of rapid, US-centered, economic growth will nearly double world GDP, an annual increase of more than 4 percent. States have | |shifted their focus from guaranteeing outcomes to providing opportunities.Rapid innovation and new technologies enable continuous | |improvements in productivity, whic h global corporations spread around the world as they expand. But economic success is not | |universal. Forty less competitive countries have been left behind due to geographic isolation, poor governance, small market size, | |or lack of strategic relevance. For most major economies, however, the United States has guaranteed political stability and open | |trade-conditions that have encouraged the creation of massive amounts of wealth. |Globalization Unwinding (GU) | |Through 2020, economic growth has been slow worldwide, averaging less than 2 percent for more than a decade. Weaker states have | |collapsed, as economic pressure translates into domestic unrest, while other states have resorted to authoritarianism or populism | |in order to stay in power. Costs of military interventions, energy price volatility, and years of deficits brought a sharp | |contraction in the US economy, and the consequent dollar crisis triggered a global economic downturn.Europe and Japan lacked the | |dy namism to lead the world out of recession, while the growth engines of China, India, Korea, and other â€Å"emerging economies† all | |sputtered-as did those of Russia and Latin America. Most developing countries have proven unable to mitigate the worst effects of | |the downturn. A deep-seated cynicism about the value of free markets prevails in the world, and economic decisions are generally | |focused on short-term returns. Protectionism grew rapidly following the downturn, and the path to recovery looks difficult. | | |Competing Horizons (CH) | | | |Large emerging markets of China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and much of Southeast Asia have sustained rapid long-term | |growth—particularly in comparison to older industrialized economies—and a second wave of developing countries has joined their | |ranks. The developing world accounted for almost two-thirds of global GDP growth between 2005 and 2020.Regional economic powers | |have started to contest US primacy in their regions, and in global forums. Poles of cutting-edge R&D have emerged, with growing | |numbers of firms from these high-growth countries rivaling the multinational companies from the United States, Europe, and Japan. | |Many other developing countries have grown rapidly following improved policies and governance and benefiting from rising volumes of| |global trade. However, rising tensions between Old World and New World powers seem inevitable in the medium term.Despite strong | |networks of trade and continued rising demand for raw materials and basic commodities, growth in parts of the developing | |world—particularly in parts of Africa—remains low. In addition, the environmental costs of broad-based growth are significant: | |accelerating environmental degradation and severe resource constraints for water, strategic minerals, and energy are the order of | |the day. | | | |* Source: World Bank, Rehearsing for the Future: the World and Development in 2020 (Wa shington DC, 2006) (www. worldbank. rg/2020) | †¢ Scale of security threats: the alternative scenarios highlight the potential for different degrees of ethnic, terrorist and regional security tensions. Kenya may thus need to be prepared for the possibility of a higher level of security-related military outlays than presently envisaged under Vision 2030. Depending on the extent of external financial support to deal with terrorism and regional security threats, this may prevent the realization of the current strategy to shift funding away from such â€Å"other sectors† for the purpose of creating fiscal space for social or growth-oriented outlays. Nature of the trade environment: the extent to which further global trade barriers are reduced, or rather shifted towards bilateral or regional trading arrangements, may potentially influence the pace of growth and potentially the sources of Kenya’s principal comparative advantage, again influencing both the prospects for revenue mobilization and the focus of the investment programme. †¢ Importance of governance concerns: Were there to be a shift in the global economic center more towards emerging market countries, there might be a reduced incentive for Kenya to focus as much on governance issues.However, given the possibility of the AL scenario also arising, and given the merits on political economy grounds for strengthening Kenya’s governance and regulatory system (particularly given the increased role envisaged for PPPs), current strategies would appear robust to the alternative possible scenarios. †¢ Pace of technological change: Alternative scenarios also suggest differences in the future pace of technological change. This could be important, particularly with respect to certain kinds of infrastructure (e. g. , in the energy and possibly the ICT sectors).Would the nature of infrastructure investment decisions be influenced by the possibility that newer and more advanced technolo gies might make existing infrastructure or technologies inappropriate? All of these uncertainties raise the question of whether fiscal policy, to be robust under alternative scenarios, should be more conservatively managed, particularly with respect to the level of nonconcessional borrowing that would be appropriate in financing the investment program (or more pointedly, in the level of any fiscal debt anchor that might be considered in managing fiscal policy).They also raise questions as to the core investment programme which would appear appropriate, given the uncertainty as to which scenario might eventuate. III. Kenya’s fiscal strategy underpinning the Vision 2030 A. Background and macroeconomic assumptions Under the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) covering the period 2003-07, Kenya made significant progress in macroeconomic management and in implementing key structural and governance reforms. As a result, the economy staged a remarkable broad-based recovery as growth of real GDP accelerated from 0. 5 percent in 2002 to 7. percent in 2007. In the aftermath of the post-election-violence (PEV) in early 2008 and the global economic slowdown, growth fell sharply in 2008 to 1. 7 percent. In 2009, the economy is projected to rebound only slightly to 2. 5 percent . Underpinning the good economic performance of recent years was the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies, and in particular, through 2007, the pursuit of a prudent fiscal stance in which the overall budget deficit (on a commitment basis, including grants) was contained to an average of about 2 per cent of GDP compared with a target of 3. percent in the ERS. As a result, there was a net domestic repayment of 0. 7 percent of GDP in 2007/08, relative to a net borrowing of 3. 6 percent of GDP in 2002/03, thereby contributing to a decline in the ratio of net domestic debt to GDP from 23 per cent in 2002/03 to roughly 17 per cent in June 2008. This facilitated a reduction in interest rates a nd an expansion of credit to the private sector in support of productive activities.With the conclusion of the ERS at end-2007, the Kenyan Government elaborated a medium-term development plan, the National Vision 2030, aimed at achieving rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. The vision had three pillars: †¢ an economic pillar whose goal was to achieve and then sustain annual real GDP growth of 10 percent by 2012 with a view to making Kenya a middle-income country by the year 2030; †¢ a social pillar aimed at creating a cohesive society enjoying equitable social development.This pillar would address inequality and poverty challenges faced by many Kenyans and move Kenya towards achieving some of the Millennium Development Goals; and †¢ a political pillar calling for an issues-based, accountable and democratic political system. Achieving the Vision 2030 growth target would require Kenya to increase its investment share in GDP from about 22 percent in 2007/08 to 33 percent by 2012/13. Over the same period, domestic savings would need to increase from about 16 percent of GDP to 28 percent. Details of the key indicators underpinning the macroeconomic framework are provided in Table 1. Table 1: Key Macroeconomic Indicators Underpinning Vision-2030 and the Medium-Term Plan | | |2007/08 |2008/09 |2009/10 |2010/11 |2011/12 |2012/13 | | | |Medium-term projections | |(Annual percentage change) | |National accounts and prices | |6. 2 |8. 3 |9. |9. 7 |10. 0 | |Real GDP |5. 7 |7. 5 |5. 0 |5. 0 |5. 0 |5. 0 | |CPI (end of period) |28. 5 | | | | | | |(In percent of GDP) | |Investment and savings | | | | | | | |Investment |21. |21. 9 |23. 3 |27. 3 |29. 9 |32. 6 | |o/w Central Government |8. 2 |8. 6 |8. 4 |8. 6 |9. 0 |9. 5 | |Gross domestic savings |15. 9 |15. 1 |17. 4 |21. 8 |24. 6 |27. 5 | |o/w Central Government |0. 4 |1. 6 |2. 7 |2. 9 |3. 2 |3. | |Central government budget | | | | | | | |Total revenue |21. 3 |21. 6 |21. 8 |21. 8 |21. 9 |22. 0 | |Total e xpenditure and net lending | | | | | | | |Overall balance (incl. grants) |29. 4 |28. 6 |27. 6 |27. 6 |27. 8 |28. | |Domestic debt, net (eop) | | | | | | | |Total Public Sector Debt |-6. 2 |-5. 6 |-4. 2 |-4. 0 |-4. 0 |-4. 0 | | |17. 8 |16. 8 |16. 5 |15. 7 |15. 0 |14. 3 | | |41. 6 |43. 0 |40. 2 |41. 3 |38. 0 |38. | |External sector | | | | | | | |Current account (incl. official transfers) | | | | | | | |Reserves (months of import cover) |-6. 0 |-6. 8 |-5. 9 |-5. 5 |-5. 3 |-5. 1 | | | | | | | | | | |3. |3. 5 |3. 7 |3. 9 |4. 2 |4. 5 | Source: Ministry of Finance; Medium-Term Budget Strategy Paper, 2008/09-2010/11. The fiscal framework underpinning the Vision 2030 scenario called for increased spending on the critical â€Å"flagship† projects, while at the same time ensuring that the overall fiscal deficit (after grants) would progressively narrow from 6. 2 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to a sustainable level of around 4 percent of GDP over the medium term. This would allow net domest ic debt to decline substantially from 17. 8 percent of GDP to 14. 3 percent by 2012/13.The strengthened fiscal position would be supported by the implementation of revenue administration measures by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), which would sustain the revenue-to-GDP ratio at around 22 percent throughout the medium-term. Under Vision 2030, public expenditure was to be restructured in favor of development spending and other priority social interventions. Improved management of public sector finances was expected to lead to a positive shift in investor and creditor confidence as well as to boost growth by providing the fiscal resources to raise public development spending from 8. percent of GDP in 2007/08 to 9 ? percent of GDP by 2012/13. B. The Medium-Term Plan, 2008-2012 (MTP)[9] To understand how the Kenya government envisaged the role of fiscal policy in its broad vision for development in the coming two decades, it is useful to begin with the first five-year development stra tegy, the Medium-Term Plan (MTP), issued in 2008 and intended to be the instrument for implementing the Vision 2030 development strategy. Two important elements underpin the MTP. First, the MTP clarified how overall resources in the economy would be allocated among the three pillars and the enabling sectors (i. . the Foundations for National Transformation) during the course of the first five-years of the Vision 2030 (see Annex Figure 1 and Annex Table 1). In particular, it highlighted the overwhelming importance that would be played by investments in infrastructure projects, particularly beginning in 2010/11. [10] While in 2008/09 and 2009/10, 21 percent of the resources was to be on infrastructure,[11] this share was to rise in the three subsequent years to about 60 percent with a heavy emphasis on roads (reflecting the inadequate maintenance and limited construction on new roads during the 1990s and earlier).The MTP also indicated that (with the exception of a short burst in 2009 /10), the social sector would absorb about 20 percent of available resources. Spending on the economic sector pillar was to drop sharply after 2008/09 (being replaced by infrastructure spending), but would then be held roughly constant for the remaining four years of the MTP period (see Annex Table 1). [12] Second, given the limited resources available to Government, the MTP emphasized that the financing of infrastructure should rely heavily on the private sector through the use of public-private-partnership (PPP) financing initiatives.For the five-year period, at least 80 percent of infrastructure spending should expect to be financed through PPPs, particularly starting in 2010/11. Thus, the success of infrastructure financing would be predicated on two important fundamentals: first, that domestic savings could be increased from about 16 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to reach 28 percent of GDP in 2012/13 and second, that a legal and regulatory framework for public-private-partnerships could quickly be put in place so investors would feel comfortable about investing in this strategy.Regarding the latter, we note that a PPP framework has been developed but has yet to be made operational. C. Medium-Term Budget Strategy Paper, 2009/10-2011//12 (MTBSP) Each year, the MTBSP provides much more detail on the government’s fiscal framework over the next three budget years, not only in terms of the allocation and financing of the budget for the different government ministries, but more importantly with regard to the key policy objectives. The most recent MTBSP was issued in June 2009 at the time of the BudgetSpeech for fiscal year 2009/10. Unlike the MTP, the MTBSP is guided by the need to be prudent on growth prospects to mitigate the risk of being overly optimistic, and in the event that higher than expected growth rates are achieved, the medium-term macroeconomic framework can be modified accordingly, with the higher revenues allocated to priority expenditures. Ta ble 2 below summarizes the main macroeconomic indicators underpinning the more cautious fiscal framework in the 2009 MTBSP.The table reveals the striking contrast between what had been assumed in the Medium-Term Plan for the next few years and the new assumptions dictated by recent domestic and external developments. Reflecting the domestic and external shocks of 2008 and 2009—the violence following the December 2007 election and the global economic slowdown—real GDP growth over the next three years is now projected to average under 5 percent, much lower than the 6. 8 percent projected in the 2008 MTBSP and half the 10 percent targeted under Vision 2030. | |Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Indicators Underpinning the MTBSP, | | |2007/08 |2008/09 |2009/10 |2010/11 |2011/12 | | | |Prel. Est. | | | | | | |Medium term projections | |(Annual percentage change) | |National accounts and prices | | | | | | |Real GDP |4. 0 |2. 5 |3. 1 |5. 2 |6. 4 | |CPI (end of period) |29. |18. 0 |10. 1 |5. 9 |5. 0 | |(In percent of GDP) | |Investment and savings |19. 1 |18. 1 |19. 2 | | | |Investment |8. 2 |7. 6 |10. 2 |22. 1 |23. 3 | |o/w Central Government |13. 5 |11. 9 |14. 1 |8. 9 |9. 1 | |Gross national savings |1. |1. 7 |2. 3 |17. 3 |19. 0 | |o/w Central Government | | | |3. 1 |3. 5 | |Central government budget | | | | | | |Total revenue |22. 0 |22. 6 |22. 3 |22. 5 |22. 6 | |Total expenditure and net lending |27. 2 |28. 5 |30. 3 |28. |28. 3 | |Overall balance (incl. grants) |-3. 5 |-4. 9 |-6. 6 |-4. 5 |-4. 2 | |Domestic debt, net (eop) |16. 9 |18. 5 |20. 6 |21. 1 |21. 1 | |Total Public Sector Debt |39. 3 |42. 6 |44. 5 |44. 3 |43. 8 | |External sector | | | | | | |Current account incl. off. ransfers |-5. 6 |-6. 2 |-5. 1 |-4. 8 |-4. 3 | |Reserves (months of import cover) |3. 4 |2. 8 |2. 9 |3. 1 |3. 5 | Source: Ministry of Finance; and the MTBSP, 2009/10-2011/12 With respect to the saving-investment balance, there is also a significant divergence between the MTP? s mediu m-term targets and the revised targets in the 2009 MTBSP. For example, the saving-to-GDP ratio is projected to reach 19 percent compared with 24. 6 percent in the MTP in 2011/12—a shortfall of 5. percentage points of GDP. Similarly, the investment-to-GDP ratio is now projected to reach only 23. 3 percent in 2011/12 compared with 29. 9 percent in the MTP—a shortfall of 6. 6 percentage points of GDP. Virtually all the projected shortfall in both saving and investment are associated with the private sector as public sector saving and capital spending are broadly as envisaged in the MTP. The large projected shortfalls in private sector saving and investment suggests that the Vision 2030 growth objectives are unlikely to be met within the timeframe originally envisaged of 2012/13.Moreover, unless the level of productivity rises sharply (or the ICOR is reduced markedly compared with the target in the MTP) in the next few years, achieving the growth objectives of the Vision 2 030 with lower investment is unlikely to be realized. Therefore, to avoid a prolonged divergence between actual outcomes and the Vision 2030 objectives, it is critical for Kenya to fast track the implementation of key reforms aimed at rapidly improving the investment climate, while putting in place the institutional framework to facilitate private sector participation in infrastructure projects through the PPPs.Without these reforms, the timeline for achieving the Vision 2030 growth objectives will not only be delayed substantially but could be seriously compromised. As in the previous year, the 2009 MTBSP also aims at maintaining revenue collection at around 22 percent of GDP over the medium term. This is quite reasonable by historical Kenyan standards and high by Sub-Saharan African standards, and reflects an assumption that revenue collection will keep up with growth in nominal GDP.No major tax rate increases are envisaged in line with Kenya’s intention to maintain a compe titive climate for foreign and domestic investors by reducing the cost of doing business. Avoiding higher taxes seems, at this time, to be a reasonable policy position, though the issue of a further increase in the overall tax share will become more important to consider as one moves further into the next decade (as discussed below). The MTBSP rightly takes a cautious view on the availability of grants and concessional loans, which are projected at roughly 3. 5 percent of GDP annually through 2011/12.However, even for this amount of financing to become available, the MTBSP recognizes that improving public expenditure and financial management will be critical in order to give comfort to development partners that their resources are being efficiently used to support economic growth and poverty reduction. The decision to exclude budget support in formulating the medium-term framework is informed by the recent success of having more predictability in budget execution by ensuring that re sources allocated to line ministries are not disrupted by the ups-and-downs of donor relations and conditionalities.This practice has been highlighted positively by Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. However, as the 2008 MTBSP emphasized, the exclusion of budgetary support should not suggest a slowdown in implementing reforms in public expenditure management, in the financial sector, and in the restructuring and/or privatizing of public enterprises. Indeed, the assumed lower donor inflows should be accompanied by an intensification of the pace of structural reforms, especially in the modernization of tax and customs administration, to ensure Kenya’s recent financial independence is sustained in line with KRA’s motto of â€Å"Tulipe Ushuru–Tujitegemee. †On the expenditure side, the 2009 MTBSP proposes an increase in overall spending from 28. 5 percent of GDP in 2008/09 to 30. 3 percent followed by a gradual reduction thereafter to about 28 perce nt by 2011/12, while simultaneously effecting a slight shift in the composition of expenditure towards development projects. As a result, the share of recurrent outlays in total outlays will have declined from a high of 90 percent in 2002/03 to 80 percent in 2006/07 and to 67 percent by 2010/11. This is consistent with Vision 2030’s objective of increased funding for the flagship infrastructure projects while still maintaining macroeconomic stability.Reflecting the importance of the other pillars of Vision 2030, and in particular, the social pillar, the proposed expenditure profile in the 2009 MTBSP provides for spending on education and health to remain broadly unchanged at around 30 percent of total spending over the medium-term (Table 3). [13] This follows significant increases in resource allocation to both sectors in recent years. Nevertheless, it may still be necessary to provide more resources to both sectors (see below) and this will require careful prioritization of spending to create the fiscal space for the shift in budget priorities.In particular, spending on other parts of the budget (including public administration, defense, internal security, etc), which is currently projected to remain broadly stable at around 46 percent of total spending, may need to be rationalized in order to release resources for the social sectors. . |Table 3: Spending on the Social and Economic Sectors (in percent of total expenditure) 1/ | | |   |2007/08 |2008/09 |2009/10 |2010/11 |2011/12 | |Social Sectors |28. % |29. 3% |30. 4% |30. 6% |29. 6% | | Health | 6. 1% |5. 7% | 6. 8% |6. 0% |6. 0% | | Education |22. 0% |23. 6% |23. 6% |24. 7% |23. 7% | |Economic Sectors |†¦ |24. 8% | 22. 9% |23. 6% |24. 8% | | Productive, incl.Agriculture |†¦ |4. 3% |3. 5% |4. 3% |4. 4% | | Physical Infrastructure |†¦ |20. 5% |19. 5% |19. 3% |20. 4% | |Other |†¦ |45. 9% |46. 7% |46. 3% |45. 6% | |Total |†¦ |100. 0 |100. 0 |100. 0 |100. 0 | / Source: The Medi um-Term Budget Strategy Paper, 2009/10-2011/12 Based on the projected revenue and expenditure, the overall budget deficit (after grants) is estimated to initially rise from 4. 9 percent in 2008/09 to about 6 percent of GDP in 2009/10—reflecting the impact of the fiscal stimulus package—and then decline to 4. 2 percent by 2011/12. (see Table 2). It is anticipated that concessional financing, mainly from multilateral institutions, non-concessional borrowing through the issuance of sovereign bonds, and domestic borrowing will cover the deficits.The projected domestic borrowing (including issuance of domestic infrastructure bonds) would result in a gradual increase in the stock of outstanding net domestic debt from 17 percent of GDP in 2007/08 to about 21 percent in 2011/12. This increase, while necessary in the context of the economic slowdown and government policy response, carries with it the risk of potentially crowding out of the private sector. This could pose diffic ulties in allowing the private sector to play its role in financing economic activities consistent with achieving the higher growth path. D. Overall fiscal and debt sustainabilityThe projected medium-term fiscal deficits are broadly consistent with fiscal and debt sustainability. Throughout the period covered by the MTBSP, the ratio of public sector debt-to-GDP fluctuates within a narrow range of 40-44 percent of GDP, implying that the net present value of debt-to–GDP ratio is well below 35 percent. [14] It should be noted that the issuance of sovereign bonds to fund high-return infrastructure projects does carry some debt sustainability risks arising from the exchange rate, making it important that the projects be subjected to rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis.Also, some caution may be needed with regard to the timing of issuance of these bonds, given the increased borrowing spreads currently facing many developing countries, as well as the recent and potential further de preciation of the Kenya Shilling against the Euro and the US dollar. Regarding contingent liabilities, a significant amount has already been taken into account in the context of the financial restructuring of the National Bank of Kenya (over Ksh. 21 billion) and during the course of privatizing Kenya Telecom.However, owing to lack of data, not all potential contingent liabilities from the parastatal sector and from the pension scheme have been included in the debt sustainability analysis. Including such contingent liabilities would increase the official public debt and the risk of the overall public debt becoming unsustainable. Another potential source of contingent liabilities is the Government’s planned heavy reliance on public-private-partnerships to finance many of the infrastructure projects for Vision 2030. It will be critical to ensure that increased use of the PPP framework is well managed and minimizes potential contingent liabilities.Reliance on PPPs in some instanc es involves some assumption of the government ultimately, in the future, financing the purchase of the privately-built assets. Moreover, depending on the terms of an individual PPP, the government could bear a number of potential risks associated with each project (demand risk, financing risk, political risk, supply risk, legal risk, etc). The Government appears to be cognizant of this danger, and intends to establish a PPP unit in the Ministry of Finance to vet all new PPP funded projects.In the meantime, the Government should avoid any new PPP projects before the finalization of the PPP legal and regulatory framework. E. The Potential Role of PPPs Can and should Kenya realistically rely on PPP mechanisms? First, there are some areas of public infrastructural spending where potentially the private sector may be willing to invest and provide services without the need for a PPP (e. g. , as has already been demonstrated in the telecommunications sector). In other sectors, the challeng e is for the government to ensure that the same public policy factors that originally motivated public sector investment and provision, e. . , equity factors, natural monopoly conditions, or externalities, are taken into account in the way in which the private sector produces and delivers services. Here the government’s task is to ensure that a clear and well-designed regulatory structure is in place, particularly with regard to pricing policy. Second, private financing in the form of a PPP entails both opportunities and risks to a government, and management of these risks is essential if there is to be a genuine sharing of both the gains and the associated risks between the public and private sectors.What makes a PPP attractive to a government is the ability to harness the potential of the private sector to construct and operate a facility with greater efficiency than would be the case for the public sector, with such efficiency gains offsetting the presumably higher borrowi ng or equity costs associated with private as opposed to government borrowing. Such efficiency gains are particularly relevant when the private sector can bundle the construction and operating phases of a project, thus allowing for internalization of cost-reducing incentives (Scandizzo and Sanguinetti, 2009).At the same time, by substituting the private sector for public provision, the government can also save scarce public funds and relieve strained budgets. But PPPs can also be used, inappropriately, to bypass spending controls and move public investments off budget and debt off the government’s balance sheet. This could leave governments bearing most of the risks involved and face large fiscal costs over the medium to long term.Experience in other countries suggests that to work effectively and for a PPP to be an appropriate approach, several key prerequisites should be satisfied: the quality of services should be contractible; there should be competition or incentive-base d regulation; as noted, there should be an appropriate distribution of risks; the institutional framework should be characterized by political commitment, good governance, clear supporting legislation (including with regard to pricing); and a transparent procedure for award of performance incentives and enforcement of sanctions throughout the concession period.Finally, a government needs to have a capacity, both in the finance and sector ministries, to effectively appraise and prioritize public infrastructure projects; design PPPs; evaluate affordability, value for money and risk transfer; correctly select those projects that are appropriate to undertake as PPPs; draft and scrutinize contracts, monitor, manage and regulate ongoing projects, and undertake periodic performance evaluations (see Sutherland et al, 2009; Scandizzo and Sanguinetti, 2009; IMF, 2004; and Tchakarov, 2007).This underscores the importance of Kenya moving at a deliberate pace to put in place a strengthened manag ement capacity in the Ministry of Finance and given, past governance failures, caution to ensure that the government sector is not burdened with excessive risks that ought legitimately to be borne by the private sector. In terms of negotiating the distribution of risk, the experience of Latin American countries with PPPs suggests that some are appropriately borne by the private partner—those associated with the construction or the operation of the project in particular.Others, such as political and regulatory risk, clearly should be borne by the government. Others—such as market demand risk, some supply side risks (the cost of foreign exchange, some factor cost risks), may be influenced by government but not fully under its control. How such risks are shared is an obviously important and sensitive aspect in the negotiation of a PPP with a private partner, since it will bear on how large are the contingent risks to which a government is exposed. Experience also has taug ht that governments entering into PPPs need to be aware, that there is a strong tendency for contracts to be renegotiated.Tchakarov (2007) notes that in Latin America and the Caribbean, over 30 percent of PPPs were renegotiated (particularly in transportation and water projects), often within the first two to three years of the award of a PPP. Key factors forcing renegotiation have included the fixed term nature of concession contracts, the challenges posed by demand risk, poor decisions at the design stage, government acceptance of aggressive bidding, or changes in the rules of the game by the government after the contract award.Tchakarov also notes that an â€Å"improper regulatory framework and poor regulatory oversight [can] increase the chances of conflict, rent capture by operators, or opportunistic behavior by government. † In sum, private sector financing offers important opportunities for Kenya to augment its fiscal space for infrastructure, but successful exploitati on of this source requires important capacity building within the government in order to ensure both fiscal savings and efficiency gains relative to public provision.F. Risks The MTBSP recognizes that the underlying medium-term assumptions are not without risks, and that the projected rate of economic growth may not be achieved. Under such circumstances, the MTBSP indicates that the government would take appropriate measures to mitigate the risks to macro-economic stability, such as by delaying or scaling back on expenditures on non-priority programs. However, the MTBSP does not identify which programs would be curtailed should revenues fall short of projection. IV.Assessing the Vision and the Medium-Term Budget Strategy ADoes Vision 2030 and the MTBSP Address the Key Challenges facing Kenya? In assessing Kenya’s fiscal policy going forward, it is probably best to work from the plans indicated in the recent MTBSP, primarily because Vision 2030 and the MTP provide less detail on the macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework. Vision 2030 is also of course more ambitious in its objectives for growth, so that any doubts raised about the MTBSP would only be more the case concerning Vision 2030.At the outset, it is worth pointing out that the fiscal framework in the MTBSP appears to be based on fairly conservative assumptions and has introduced some degree of flexibility that can accommodate several alternative scenarios. In particular, the assumed lower growth in the MTBSP compared with the Vision 2030 is, regrettably, realistic in light of recent global developments. However, the projected constant ratio of revenue-to-GDP ratio also comes at a time when KRA is undertaking significant reforms in the customs and tax administration.This means that there is likely to be a revenue windfall. The projected disbursement of concessional loans in line with GDP assumes no improvement in absorption capacity in the key line ministries from the low levels of between 40-5 0 percent and the authorities have underscored this as an objective to pursue in coming years. With the recent enhanced monitoring of project implementation, the absorption of donor funds should increase. The exclusion of donor budget support from the framework at a time when PFM/PEM reforms are on-going also suggests a potential upside in donor support.Finally even with the increase in government spending associated with the fiscal stimulus, the level of public sector debt to GDP ratio still provides some scope for additional domestic borrowing to fund key infrastructure projects, if warranted, without jeopardizing Kenya’s debt sustainability status. All in all, with the exception of the growth scenario, most of the other assumptions appear fairly cautious and leave room for some over performance. Thugge et al make several key observations on these issues.While acknowledging that the authorities have articulated a sensible and ambitious policy strategy, recent domestic polit ical events and the global economic downturn highlight the setbacks to its realization almost from the outset. Revenue shortfalls, limited efforts at rationalizing spending in noncritical sectors, and the slow pace of civil service rationalization will limit the potential for meeting policy objectives in the health and education sectors, both in terms of levels of spending and efforts at increased sectoral efficiency.The need for increased infrastructural spending is recognized, but financing efforts remain impeded by the lack of progress on setting out the policy framework for enhanced private sector participation and an improved investment climate. Enhanced revenue efforts will also be needed, particularly from personal and corporate income taxes and from an increase in the effective VAT rate. Fifth, the MTP calls for a sharp increase in overall investment in order to achieve the planned 10 percent real GDP growth.However, in light of the sharply lower medium-term levels of saving and investment now projected in the MTBSP, the government needs to move with deliberate speed to implement structural reforms and improve the investment climate in order to raise productivity rapidly. Without a significant increase in total factor productivity, achieving the Vision 2030 growth objectives could be seriously impaired.One implication of the limited amount of resources available to G

Communication in Children / Young People Essay

Speech, language and communication play a vital role in our lives. Without being able to talk to, and understand other people we can’t do things alike: Almost everything we do involves speech, language and or communication Children develop communication skills from birth. They rely on speech, language and communication to be able to learn at school and play with their friends. They need these skills to reach their full potential. Children begin to understand words before they can say them. They then learn how to say these words and how to put them together to make sentences. Some develop quickly, while others may take longer. Being able to say what you want? and to understand what others are saying are the most important skills we need in life. Yet many people take communication for granted. For some children and young people, communicating with others is difficult and they have speech, language and communication needs – SLCN. This short essay outlines the importance of communication at school, and provides information about SLCN and highlights ways through which a better environment can be structured to facilitate better communication and how those who support them need to understand their difficulties and their ways of communicating. What is (SLCN)? The term speech, language and communication needs (SLCN) encompass a wide range of difficulties related to all aspects of communication in children and young people. These? can include difficulties with fluency, forming sounds and words, formulating sentences, understanding what others say, and using language socially. † Bercow, J. (2008) The Bercow Report: A Review of Services for Children and Young People (0-19) with Speech, Language and Communication Needs, p. 13. Put simply, children and young people with SLCN find it difficult to communicate with others. This can be because of difficulties with speech, with talking, with understanding what is said to them or with interacting with other people around them. How well adults understand SLCN can have a really important effect on the impact SLCN make on children and young people’s lives. For some, language is the only difficulty they have; everything? else, like their cognitive and physical skills are ok. This can be called a primary or specific speech, language or communication difficulty or impairment. You may hear the term SLI (specific language impairment). For others, their SLCN are part of another condition. This can include things like learning difficulties, autism and hearing impairment. SLCN can be very severe and complex. The impacts for children and young people can be felt across all areas of their learning and development. Some children and young people have less severe forms of SLCN. This may be called delayed speech, language and communication. Children and young people are developing speech, language and communication in the same way? as others, following typical patterns of development, but at a slower rate. Defining Speech, Language and Communication Speech: refers to, saying sounds accurately and in the right places in words; speaking fluently, without hesitating, or prolonging or repeating words or sounds. Language: refers to speaking and understanding what is been said; using words to build up sentences, sentences to build up conversations and longer stretches of spoken words and making sense of what people say. Language is used to represent concepts and thoughts. Communication: refers to how we interact with others; Communication is a vital and continuing process. It is the means by which all humans make contact, share experiences, understand their world and find their place within it. Why are speech, language and communication skills important? Speech, language and communication skills are the building blocks for learning. Children use their knowledge of sounds in learning to read and spell. They use the words they know to understand what they hear, to share what they think and to ask questions. These words and concepts are vital for making sense of new information or ideas that they are finding out about. Children and young people’s interactions at school with adults and their peers are crucial in supporting their learning. Research has shown that in areas of social disadvantage, at least 50% of children have delayed language. (Locke, A. , Ginsborg, J. , and Peers, I. 2002) however, it’s important to note that children and young people from all areas and backgrounds can have delayed language. Clinical Pragmatics reflects an emerging awareness that some communication difficulties could not be attributed to ‘purely’ linguistic problems. For a long time before that, practicing speech and language therapists had worked with children and adults whose primary difficulties seemed to lie with the understanding and/or production of connected discourse. (‘Relevance Theory and Communication Disorders’ Eeva Leinonen and Nuala Ryder, 2008. ) Communication is the basis of our lives and we would in this day and age, be handicapped without it. Everyday we are communicating with each other in some way or another, be it by using words, actions or even expressions in conveying a message. Communication refers to the exchange of thoughts and ideas with the intention of conveying information. The purpose of communication is to convey one’s beliefs, ideas, thoughts, or needs with clarity so as to reach a consensus or a mutually acceptable solution. But there are factors that can either hinder or help us communicate effectively or not they can be physical or non- physical. The Physical- refers to the environment surrounding the participants in the communication process; for example: (good) good ventilation, chairs and other materials are properly arrange, temperature is set just right, the place or venue is presentable.. tc. (bad) a very noisy place, air pollution, the place is very dirty and the materials for the event is not properly arrange, poor ventilation and extreme temperature. Non physical- negative attitudes of both source and receiver are barriers to effective communication this comes in the form of disinterest, bigotry, arrogance, or negligence. Facilitating effective communication among children with SLCN A communication friendly environment should make communication as easy, effective and enjoyable as possible. It should provide opportunities for everyone to talk, listen, understand and take part. There are also simple ways you can make your classroom ‘communication friendly’. This might include thinking about: Space, light and layout? , Noise levels? , Using visual support? , Clear and consistent routines Whatever age you teach, whatever your subject, language is crucial. How many new words do you use in one day? How much do your classes talk with each other, work in groups or share what they have done with the rest of the class? How do you use language to instruct, explain, question and extend? How much written language is there too? The Cambridge Primary Review states: ‘the ways in which teachers talk to children can influence learning, memory, understanding and the motivation to learn. ’ The first step in identifying a pupil? who has SLCN is by someone noticing that they are struggling with their communication. As a teacher, you have a crucial role in being the ‘someone’ who spots these difficulties. Some ways to help improve communication? are using simple language? ; Use short chunks of language and; only include the important points; repeat and rephrase where necessary; slow your speech and insert more pauses; ? se shorter sentences? and, avoid difficult words. This will support the communication development t? of all children and young ? people but for some, more specialist interventions will be needed by suitably qualified and experienced professionals e. g. SLT’s and specialist teachers. This might be through a recognized programme such? as the Nuffield Dyspraxia Programme, Language ? through reading or social ? use of Language Programme, or through a combination of approaches tailored to suit the individual child. Communication may be supported through AAC ? uch as signing, use of low- tech strategies such as Picture Exchange Communication System (PECS) or an electronic voice output device. This will also mean that adults supporting these children will need specialist skills and training. Conclusion With the right support at the right time, children and young people with SLCN can have their needs understood, identified and supported. This will enable them to engage positively with learning and socializing, to develop independence and a positive self-image and to experience a wide range of life chances.